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a	 context	 of	 exogeneous	 uncertainty	 on	 carbon	 price.	 Contrasting	 results	 are	
obtained.	In	some	cases,	the	usual	irreversibility	effects	hold,	fewer	plants	of	the	
LCT	 should	 be	 developed	when	 information	 is	 anticipated.	 In	 other	 cases,	 this	
result	is	reversed	and	information	arrival	can	justify	an	early	deployment	of	the	
LCT.	 More	 precisely,	 it	 is	 shown	 that	 marginal	 reasoning	 is	 limited	 when	
















Low	 carbon	 technologies	 (LCTs)	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 major	 option	 for	
reducing	 emissions	 from	 the	 electricity	 industry,	 which	 is	 the	 main	 emitting	
industrial	 sector.	 The	most	 promising	 options	 are:	 carbon	 capture	 and	 storage	
(CCS),	 the	 new	 nuclear,	 solar	 thermal	 plants,	 and	 offshore	 windpower	 farms.	
These	 technologies	 require	 high	 upfront	 capital	 investments	 and	 long	
construction	 lead‐times.	Such	new	 large‐size	 technologies	must	undergo	a	 long	
and	 risky	 transition	 stage	 before	 they	 become	 commercially	 available	 (Grubb	





scientific	 knowledge.	 Such	 uncertainty	 must	 be	 considered	 by	 a	 firm	 when	
deciding	 how	 much	 to	 invest	 in	 LCT	 equipment.	 Similarly,	 governments	 must	
consider	uncertainty	surrounding	any	future	international	climate	regime	when	
creating	 policies	 to	 support	 the	 deployment	 of	 LCTs.	 The	 public	 support	 to	 an	
LCT	 is	 justified	 by	 learning‐by‐doing	 and	 more	 generally	 by	 endogenous	
technical	change,	if	there	are	spill	overs	from	one	firm	to	another	(Arrow,	1962).	
	
	 In	 the	 present	 article,	 an	 analytical	 model	 of	 a	 regulator’s	 sequential	
choice	 of	 LCT	 plants	 in	 the	 context	 of	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 carbon	 price	 is	
developped.	 There	 are	 two	 periods	 and	 two	 technologies	 a	 LCT	 and	 a	 carbon	
technology.	In	the	first	period,	the	regulator	chooses		a	particular	number	of	LCT	
plants.	In	this	period,	because	the	LCT	is	more	costly	than	the	carbon	technology,	





first	 period,	 is	 investigated.	 Two	 optimal	 investments	 in	 the	 LCT	 capacity	 are	
compared.	These	two	investments	minimize	the	aggregate	expected	costs	in	two	
scenarios,	with	and	without	learning	of	the	true	CO2	price	in	the	second	period.	
In	 both	 scenarios,	 in	 the	 first	 period,	 the	 regulator	has	 an	 a	 priori	 uncertainty	
regarding	the	carbon	price.	In	the	“uninformed”	scenario,	the	regulator	has	still	
no	 information	 in	 the	 second	 period;	 in	 the	 “informed”	 scenario,	 the	 regulator	
learns	the	true	carbon	price	in	the	second	period.	The	 	change	from	the	first	to	
the	 second	scenario	 is	 interpreted	as	an	 increase	 in	 information.	The	objective	








	 It	 is	 shown	 that,	 if	 the	 expected	 price	 of	 CO2	 is	 high,	 the	 standard	
irreversibility	effect	holds:	 there	should	be	 less	 investment	 in	LCT	plants	when	
information	will	 be	 available	 than	 in	 an	 uninformed	 scenario.	 However,	 if	 the	
expected	 price	 of	 CO2	 is	 low	 and	 uncertainty	 is	 sufficiently	 high,	 larger	
investment	in	the	LCT	occurs	when	information	will	be	available.	More	precisely,	
the	LCT	 is	not	developed	 in	 the	uninformed	scenario,	whereas	 in	 the	 informed	
scenario,	 a	 strictly	 positive	 quantity	 of	 plants	 is	 developed.	 This	 stresses	 the	
distinction	of	the	two	decisions:	whether	or	not	to	launch	an	LCT	policy,	and	its	




analyzes	 how	 irreversible	 decisions	 are	 influenced	 by	 uncertainty	 and	
information	 acquisition.	 Initiated	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 environmental	
preservation,	the	standard	irreversibility	effect	(Henry,	1974;	Arrow	and	Fisher,	
1974)	 explains	 that	 the	prospect	of	 obtaining	 information	 in	 the	 future	 should	
limit	 today's	 irreversible	 actions.	 Applied	 to	 analyzing	 firms'	 investment	
decision,	 the	 notion	 of	 option	 value	 emphasizes	 the	 idea	 that	 investing	 today	
eliminates	the	option	to	 invest	 later	and	explains	that	 investments	are	reduced	
by	the	prospect	 to	obtain	 information	(Bernanke,	1983;	Pyndick,	1988;	Dixit	et	








also	 their	accumulation	determines	 the	sign	of	 the	effect	of	 learning	on	today’s	
emission;	 and	 Ulph	 and	 Ulph	 (1997)	 show	 that	 the	 effect	 of	 emissions	
accumulation	counteracts	the	effect	of	emissions	irreversibility.	They	establish	in	
a	 quadratic	 framework,	 that	 learning	 reduces	 today’s	 effort	 if	 the	 emissions	
constraint	is	never	binding	(see	also	Karp	and	Zhang,	2006).	Gollier	et	al.	(2000)	
provide	 an	 analytical	 analysis	 of	 the	 interactions	 between	 accumulation	 and	
irreversibility	of	pollutant	emissions	(see	also	Lange	and	Treich,	2008).	Kolstad	
(1996)	 considers	 the	 tension	 between	 two	 irreversibility	 constraints:	 the	
irreversibility	 of	 today's	 emissions	 and	 the	 irreversibility	 of	 clean	 capital	
investment.	Kolstad	(1996)	concludes	that	the	latter	is	more	likely	to	be	binding;	
thus,	 information	acquisition	 implies	that	 less	 investment	should	be	committed	
in	 clean	 capital,	 but	 this	 neglects	 the	 existence	 of	 learning‐by‐doing,	 which	 is	










In	 the	 present	 article,	 accumulation	 and	 irreversibility	 of	 emissions	 are	











that	 the	 presence	 of	 uncertainty	 on	 the	 carbon	 price	 increases	 the	 value	 of	 an	
R&D	 project.	 The	 present	 analysis	 creates	 a	 bridge	 between	 these	 two	
approaches.	Considering	the	two	aforementioned	studies,		contrasting	results	in	
the	 present	 article	 are	 obtained	 for	 two	 reasons:	 first	 while	 Baker	 and	 Shittu	
(2006)	 focus	 on	 interior	 equilibria	 and	 use	 marginal	 reasoning,	 the	 present	
analysis	highlights	 that	marginal	 reasoning	 is	not	 sufficient	because	of	 the	non	
convexity	specific	 to	R&D	and	 learning‐by‐doing	 investments,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	
consider	 	global	conditions;	second,	Schimmelpfenning	(1995)	only	considers	a	
binary	 choice	 and	 does	 not	 analyze	 how	 the	 size	 of	 the	 project	 is	 affected	 by	
uncertainty	when	the	project	is	launched.			
	
			 Both	 R&D	 and	 learning‐by‐doing	 are	 examples	 of	 endogenous	 technical	




such	 models	 increases	 model	 complexity	 and	 problematic	 non‐convexities.	
Manne	 and	 Barreto	 (2004)	 discuss	 the	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 these	 non‐
convexities;	they	emphasize	that	with	standard	algorithms	there	is	no	guarantee	
that	a	local	optimum	will	also	be	a	global	optimum.	This	issue	is	also	outlined	in	




easily	handled,	and	 the	analysis	shows	how	 it	 interacts	with	 the	uncertainty	of	
climate	 policy.	 Furthermore,	 the	 results	 of	 numerical	 models	 are	 highly	
dependent	of	their	calibration.	Even	though	a	thorough	numerical	simulation	is	
not	done	here,	 it	 is	worth	mentioning	 the	difficulties	 to	estimate	 learning	rates	
and	 some	 associated	 issues	 that	 are	 relevant	 to	 interpret	 the	 results.	 For	
instance,	McDonald	 and	 Schrattenholzer	 (2001)	 survey	 estimations	 of	 learning	
rates	 in	 the	energy	sector	and	show,	 for	photovoltaics,	how	the	same	data	sets	




of	 an	 output	 price	 with	 cumulative	 production	 could	 be	 explained	 by	 several	
mechanisms.	 It	 could	 be	 difficult	 to	 disentangle	 the	 specific	 role	 played	 by	
EPRG	WP	1215	
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learning‐by‐doing	 from	 the	 role	 of	 R&D,	 economies	 of	 scale	 and	 spillovers	 or	
even	 producers'	 pricing	 strategies	 (Sagar	 and	 Van	 der	 Zwaan,	 2006;	 Jamasb,	
2007).	 In	 the	present	work,	 it	 is	 simply	 assumed	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 an	LCT	plant	
decreases	with	cumulative	investment.		The	precise	mechanisms	underlying	this	




The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 In	 Section	 2,	 the	 model	 is	
introduced.	In	Section	3,	the	choices	of	LCT	investment	when	information	arrival	
is	 not	 anticipated	 (the	 uninformed	 scenario)	 	 when	 information	 is	 anticipated	
(the	 informed	 scenario)	 are	 compared.	 In	 Section	 4,	 the	 assumptions	 of	 the	








produce	 a	 homogenous	 good.	 The	 first	 technology	 represents	 an	 LCT	whereas	
the	 second	 technology	 is	 conventional	 carbon	 technology.	 The	 aggregate	
quantity	 of	 plants	 that	 should	 be	 built	 is	 fixed.	 For	 the	 sake	 of	 simplification,	
existing	and	new	equipment	are	supposed	to	produce	at	 full	capacity	 to	satisfy	
the	demand	during	the	two	periods.	The	demand	to	supply	in	the	first	period	is	
1D 	and	the	demand	in	the	second	period	is	 21 DD  .	The	production	capacity	that	
should	 be	 installed	 in	 the	 first	 period	 is	 1D 	 and	 the	 production	 capacity	 that	
should	be	built	 in	 the	second	period	 is	 2D .	The	demand	is	assumed	inelastic	 in	
order	 to	 simplify	 the	 analytical	 model,	 this	 assumption	 is	 relaxed	 in	 the	
numerical	application	provided	in	Section	4.	The	cost	of	LCT	plants	is	subject	to	




xD 1 	 plants	 belong	 to	 the	 conventional	 carbon	 technology.	 In	 the	 second	
period,	 the	 2D 	 additional	 plants	 are	 either	 LCT	 or	 conventional,	 depending	 on	
their	marginal	costs.	The	cheaper	technology	is	used	to	produce	all	plants.	
In	 the	 first	 period,	 the	 marginal	 cost	 of	 plants	 of	 both	 types	 is	 constant;	 the	
marginal	 cost	of	 the	LCT	 is	 1c ,	 and	 the	marginal	 cost	of	 the	 conventional	 is	 1 .	
Both	are	positive,	and	the	conventional	technology	is	cheaper	than	the	LCT	in	the	
first	period:	 11 < c .	The	second	period	marginal	cost	of	the	LCT	depends	on	 x ;	it	
is	denoted	 )(2 xc .	Learning‐by‐doing	is	represented	by	the	assumptions:		





















	 	 	 	 	 (2)	
	 The	 second	 period	 cost	 of	 a	 conventional	 plant	 is	  2 	 where	  	 is	 a	
random	 variable	 that	 represents	 the	 uncertainty	 surrounding	 CO2	 emissions	
prices.	 The	 expected	 value	 of	  	 is	 0 ,	 and	 2 	 is	 the	 expected	 cost	 of	 the	
conventional	technology,	which	is	assumed	to	be	lower	than	the	cost	of	LCT	if	no	
LCT	plants	are	built	in	the	first	period:	 c<2 .	The	random	parameter	 	is	either	
negative	 at	 the	 level	 l 	 with	 probability	  	 or	 positive	 	 at	 the	 level	 h 	 with	
probability	 1 .	 	 The	 parameter	  	 represents	 the	 state	 of	 the	 world,	 it	 is	




to	 preceding	 investments	 and	 not	 with	 respect	 to	 current	 investments.	 This	
assumption	is	used	to	cast	the	temporal	dimension	of	learning‐by‐doing.	If	firms	
invest	 today,	 it	makes	 LCT	 plants	more	 competitive	 tomorrow.	 Learning	 gains	
cannot	 be	 immediately	 obtained	 by	 investing	 in	 LCT	 plants	 (a	 standard	
assumption	 in	most	models	 of	 learning‐by‐doing	 or	 knowledge	diffusion).	 This	
temporal	 aspect	 of	 learning‐by‐doing	 is	 at	 the	 root	 of	 the	 option	 value	 of	 first	
period	investments	in	the	LCTs.		
	
The	 costs	 functions	 should	 be	 addressed	 given	 the	 three	 following	
simplifications:	the	differences	in	cost	structures	(ratio	of	variable	to	sunk	costs)	
are	 not	 considered,	 the	 cost	 of	 a	 conventional	 plant	 in	 the	 first	 period	 is	 not	
random,	and	the	discount	rate	is	only	implicit.	First,	all	costs	are	complete	costs	
that	 encompass	 both	 investment	 costs	 and	 the	 sum	 of	 annual	 operation	 and	
maintenance	 fixed	 and	 variable	 costs,	 which	 are	 implicitly	 discounted.	 The	
variables	costs	are	accounted	 for	 in	 the	 technology	cost	of	 the	decision	period.	
Second,	the	first	period	cost	of	the	conventional	technology	is	modeled	as	certain	
while	 its	 variable	 component	 is	 related	 to	 the	 CO2	 price.	 Thus,	 1 	 should	 be	
considered	as	the	long	run	expected	marginal	cost	of	conventional	plants	in	the	
first	period.	By	not	 introducing	 the	uncertainty	 in	 the	 first	period	conventional	
costs,	it	is		implicitly	assumed	that	all	conventional	plants	built	in	the	first	period	





greater	 effect	 on	 LCT	 costs	 than	 on	 conventional	 costs	 because	 LCTs	 are	
generally	more	capital	 intensive	than	conventional	technologies.	 In	addition,	an	







assumption	 is	 that	 the	 environmental	 damage	 is	 linear,	 so	 the	 second	 period	
optimal	price	of	emissions	is	neither	influenced	by	the	first	period	emissions	or	







The	objective	of	the	regulator	is	to	minimize	the	cost	of	 1D 	and	 2D 	plants.	
The	aggregate	cost	in	a	state	 	is:		
	 	      222111 ),(min=),( xcDxDxcxC 	 	 	 (3)	
	To	understand	the	influence	of	information	discovery,	the	usual	methodology	of	
the	option	value	 literature	 is	used.	Two	situations	are	compared	 in	which	  	 is	
known	 or	 not	 known	 when	 the	 second	 period	 plants	 are	 built.	 In	 the	 the	
uninformed	 scenario	  	 is	 unknown	 when	 the	 second	 period	 technology	 is	
selected;	 the	 choice	 is	 based	 on	 the	 expected	 cost	 2 .	 This	 corresponds	 to	 the	
choice	 made	 when	 no	 information	 is	 obtained	 between	 the	 first	 and	 second	
period,	or	to	the	choice	made	by	a	regulator	that	does	not	anticipate	that	he	will	
acquire	that	information	(see	Lorenz	et	al.,	2012,	for	a	discussion).	It	means	that	
the	 regulator	 	 uses	 the	 expected	 CO2	 price	 to	 assess	 whether	 the	 LCT	will	 be	
further	developed	 in	 the	 future.	Given	 that	 the	 expected	value	 of	 	 is	 zero,	 the	
objective	is:2			




with	 an	 informed	 scenario	 in	 which	 the	 regulator	 anticipates	 obtaining	
information	in	the	future.	Formally,	in	the	informed		scenario,	the	second	period	
technology	is	chosen	once	 	is	known.	The	timing	is:			
				1.		 x 	is	chosen	with	prior	belief	on	 ;		
				2.	 	 	 is	learned	and	either	LCT	or	conventional	technology	is	used	for	the	 2D 	
remaining	plants.		
In	this	case,	the	problem	is:		
	 	 E 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (5)	
	and	its	solution	is	denoted	as	 Lx .		
The	value	of	information	acquisition	for	any	 x 	is	the	difference:		
                                                 
2To	better	suit	the	option	value	literature,	we	could	have	made	explicit	the	choice	of	technology	
in	 the	 second	 period;	 for	 instance,	 with	 a	 variable	  convLCTz , 	 and	 a	 cost	 function	
),,( zx ,	the	uninformed	minimization	problem	would	have	been	 )],,([min , zxEzx  ,	while	
with	 information	 discovery,	 it	 would	 be	  ),,(minmin zxE zx  .	 Due	 to	 the	 linearity	 of	 our	













In	 this	 section,	 the	 optimal	 policy	 in	 the	 uninformed	 scenario,	 when	
information	arrival	is	not	anticipated,	is	analyzed.	Learning‐by‐doing	introduces	
a	particular	 form	of	spillovers	across	periods	 in	 the	production	process:	plants	
that	 are	 developed	 initially	 reduce	 the	 cost	 of	 following	 projects.	 The	 effect	 of	
first	period	LCT	plants	on	the	aggregated	expected	cost	(eq.	3)	with	 0= 	is:		













































The	 solution	 of	 marginal	 reasoning	 would	 be	 )( 2* Dx 	 in	 which	 	 is	 the	
quantity	that	minimizes	the	cost	 :	




	 	 	  .= 2211 xx
cDc 
  		 	 	 	 	 (9)	
	
In	order	to	avoid	situations	in	which	all	first	period	plants	are	of	the	LCT	
type,	 because	 it	 seems	 unrealistic	 and	 can	 make	 the	 exposition	 rather	
cumbersome,	 a	 further	 assumption	 is	 necessary;	 the	 number	 of	 first	 period	
plants	should	be	sufficiently	large.	Thus,	in	the	rest	of	the	paper,	it	is	assume	that	
the	quantities	of	plants	 1D 	and	 2D 	satisfy:		
















Lemma	1	A	 strictly	positive	quantity	of	LCT	 is	developed	 in	 the	 first	period,	 i.e.	
0>0x ,	 if	and	only	 if	the	conventional	technology	cost	( 2 )	 is	strictly	 larger	 than	
2
~ 	where:		
	 	 	 			 	 														(10)	
		
A	 strictly	 positive	 quantity	 of	 LCT	 plants	 is	 developed	 if	 learning	 effects	 are	
sufficiently	important	to	compensate	for	the	loss	due	to	the	relatively	higher	cost	
of	the	LCT	in	the	first	period.	The	condition	 22 ~>  	stands	for	a	global	and	not	a	
marginal	comparison	of	costs.	Two	situations	in	which	marginal	reasoning	would	
be	misleading	can	arise	because	there	are	two	local	minimums	one	at	0	and	the	
other	 one	 at	 	 	 ,	 in	 both	 cases	 the	 necessary	marginal	 conditions	 to	 be	 a	








is	 now	 contingent	 on	 the	 true	 cost	 of	 the	 conventional	 technology.	 If	 this	
technology	 turns	 out	 to	 be	 cheap	 ( l = ),	 the	 LCT	 might	 be	 useless	 and	 the	
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learning‐by‐doing	 effects	 are	 wasted.	 However,	 if	 the	 conventional	 technology	
turns	 out	 to	 be	 expensive	 ( h = ),	 the	 learning‐by‐doing	 effects	 are	 valuable.	
The	 former	effect,	 the	possibility	 of	 finding	 that	 the	LCT	 is	worthless,	 is	 at	 the	
root	 of	 the	 standard	 irreversibility	 effect,	 while	 the	 latter	 can	 justify	 an	 early	
development	 of	 LCT	 plants	 that	 would	 not	 have	 been	 completed	 without	



















































































Proposition	1	If 	(cf.	eq.	10)there	 is	less	LCT	developped	with	 information	
than	without		
	 .0xxL  	




 (0)< 2211  	 (14)	
	  ,)(< 222 Dxcl   	(15)	





   	 (16)	
	there	is	a	strictly	positive	quantity	of	LCT	plants	built	with	information:		
	 .=0> 0xx L 	
	
	
The	proposition	 sets	 conditions	under	which	 the	 classical	 irreversibility	
effect	 does	 or	 does	 not	 hold.	 For	 some	 range	of	 parameters,	 the	 irreversibility	
effect	 holds.	 If	 the	 LCT	 is	 developed	 without	 information,	 the	 anticipation	 of	
information	arrival	reduces	the	benefits	from	first	period	LCT	plants	because	the	
LCT	may	go	unused	if	the	conventional	technology	is	cheaper	than	expected.	In	
this	 case,	 it	 is	worth	waiting	 and	 postponing	 investment	 in	 the	 LCT.	However,	
Proposition	 1	 proves	 that	 for	 other	 ranges	 of	 parameters,	 the	 irreversibility	
effect	 is	 reversed,	 information	 acquisition	 can	 justify	 an	 early	 development	 of	




CO2	 policy	 ( h = );	 it	 is	 not	 sufficient	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 lax	 policy	 ( l = )	 A	
situation	in	which	it	is	found	(against	the	classicla	ireeversibility	effect)	that	the	
should	be	used	 can	only	 occur	 if	 the	LCT	 is	 not	 developped	 in	 the	uninformed	
scenario.	 Thus,	 the	 irreversibility	 effect	 is	 only	 reversed	 in	 the	 case	 in	 which	
there	 is	 no	 investment	 in	 LCT	 plants	 in	 the	 uniformed	 scenario.	 For	 this	 last	
situation	to	hold,	the	difference	between	the	two	possible	cost	 lh   	should	be	
sufficiently	important.	Note	that	if:		






the	 figure)	 decreases	 at	 Lx ;	 thus,	 if	 the	 optimal	 policy	 0x 	 were	 an	 interior	
solution	of	 the	optimization	problem,	 it	would	be	 larger	 than	 Lx .	The	expected	
cost	without	 information	 is	 decreasing	 at	 Lx 	 because	 LCT	 is	more	 likely	 to	 be	
used	with	 information	 than	without	 it.	 It	 is	 therefore	 true	 that	 if	 Lx 	 has	 been	
already	built	 it	would	be	 rational	 to	 further	develop	 the	LCT	 technology	 in	 the	











First,	 the	 use	 of	 a	 two‐periods	 framework	 is	 common	 in	 option	 value	
literature.	 In	 our	 case,	 one	 limit	 of	 this	 simplification	 is	 that	 the	 learning‐by‐




could	 be	 justified	 by	 the	 large	 time‐span	 of	 construction	 and	 return	 on	
experience.	 This	 timespan	 is	 particularly	 important	 for	 complex	 technologies.	
Nevertheless	 to	 model	 an	 analysis	 with	 more	 periods	 that	 would	 take	 into	
account	 the	 successive	 learning‐by‐doing	 effects	 and	 scale	 economies	 in	 the	
equipment	 industries,	 it	 would	 require	 to	 specify	 the	 timing	 of	 information	
revelation	and	demand	growth	(see	Karp	and	Zhang,	2006).	This	would	raise	the	
following	questions:	When	and	in	which	information	set	should	the	LCT	policy	be	
launched?	Which	 scale	 the	 LCT	 deployment	 should	 have	 ideally	 ?	 A	 priori,	 the	
same	kind	of	effect	that	has	exhibited	in	the	present	analyzis	would	be	at	work	in	
any	 information	 set.	 	 The	 present	 framework	 could	 describe	 the	 particular	
situation	where,	 in	 the	 second	period,	 all	 information	 is	 obtained	 and	 demand	




simply	 added	 while	 all	 uncertainties	 are	 resolved	 at	 the	 second	 period	 but	
demand	still	 grows	 in	 the	 third	one,	 the	second‐period	LCT	 investments	would	
be	more	valuable	because	of	 learning‐by‐doing.	 In	such	case,	 the	results	would	
still	hold	but	 the	 threshold	cost	 2~ 	would	be	smaller	and	 the	optimality	of	 the	
early	development	situation	less	likely.	
	
Second,	 concerning	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 carbon	price,	 a	 continuum	of	




two	 extreme	 cases	 are	 compared	 here:	 without	 and	 with	 information	 and	 it	
would	be	possible	to	analyze	more	general	changes	in	the	distribution	of	demand	
states,	 as	 an	 increase	 in	 risk	 (Rothshild	 and	 Stiglitz,	 1970),	 on	 the	 optimal	
quantity	of	LCT	plants.	Such	an	analysis	would	lead	to	ambiguous	results	that	are	
similar	to	those	obtained	in	the	seminal	work	of	Rothshild	and	Stioglitz	(1971)	as	
well	as	 in	 the	more	recent,	and	more	closely	 related,	work	of	Baker	and	Shittu	
(2006).	 These	 ambiguities	 would	 be	 obtained	 by	 comparing	 interior	
equilibriums.	The	insight	of	the	present	work	is	not	the	mere	possibility	that	in	









was	 considered	 to	 be	 exogenous	 i.e.,	 demands	 were	 assumed	 to	 be	 price	
inelastic.	 With	 this	 assumption,	 the	 non‐convexity	 introduced	 by	 learning‐by‐
doing	 was	 clear	 and	 easily	 handled.	 With	 elastic	 demands,	 there	 are	 more	
variables	to	be	chosen	in	the	first	period:	not	only	the	quantity	of	LCT	plants	but	
also	the	total	quantity	of	plants.	More	precisely,	 if	 the	social	surplus	created	by	
plants	in	period	 1,2=t 	is	denoted	by	 tS ,	the	social	welfare	in	a	state	 	would	be		
	 	 (17)	
and	 	would	be	chosen	with	or	without	information.	In	a	state	 	it	would	solve	
the	 first	 order	 condition	 The	 non	 convexity	
that	 was	 exposed	 in	 the	 	 simple	 model	 is	 also	 present	 in	 such	 a	 model;	 it	 is	
related	to	the	need	to	invest	sufficiently	in	LCT	plants	to	make	them	competitive.	
The	 effect	 stressed	 with	 the	 simpler	 version	 would	 still	 hold	 and	 explain	 the	
possibility	of	 situations	 in	which	 the	LCT	 is	not	developed	without	uncertainty	
but	is	developed	with	uncertainty.	However,	in	the	other	case,	where	the	LCT	is	
developed	without	uncertainty,	 the	comparison	 is	 less	straightforward	because	
of	 a	 cross	 effect.	With	 information,	 the	 total	 quantity	 of	 first	 period	 plants	 1D 	
should	 be	 smaller	 (as	 the	 irreversibility	 effect	 suggests),	 and	 this	 reduction	
induces	more	 plants	 to	 be	 built	 in	 the	 second	 period	 	 and	 this	 increase	 has	 a	
positive	 effect	 on	 the	marginal	 value	 of	 LCT	 plants.	 The	 substitution	 between	
first	 and	 second	 periods	 plants	 would	 increase	 the	 incentive	 to	 invest	 in	 LCT	
today.	 Because	 of	 this	 cross	 effect	 the	 model	 is	 hardly	 solvable	 and	 the	






To	 complete	 the	 formal	 analyzis	 a	 numerical	 illustration	 is	 performed.	
This	 illustration	 is	used	to	partly	adress	one	of	 the	 limitations	mentionned,	 the	
inelasticity	 of	 demand,	 and	 to	 consider	 the	 effect	 of	 some	 key	parameters:	 the	
learning	rate,	 the	expected	CO2	price	and	volatility.	The	 illustration	 is	based	on	
the	case	of	coal	power	plants	and	Carbon	Capture	and	Storage	(CCS).	
	
The	 two	 periods	 are	 2015‐2030	 for	 t=1,	 and	 2030	 and	 beyond	 for	 t=2.	
Two	 yearly	 demand	 functions	 are	 calibrated	 and	 two	 surplus	 	 and	











The	 conventional	 technology	 is	 pulverized	 coal	 conbustion	 power	
generation	without	CO2	capture	and	the	LCT	is	the	same	technology	with	a	post‐
conbustion	 capture	 equipment.	 The	 calibration	 of	 costs	 is	 presnted	 in	 Table	 1.	
These	assumptions	are	from	MIT	(2007).	Each	cost	is	composed	of	an	investment	
part,	 that	 represents	 the	 cost	 to	 build	 the	 capacity	 and	 a	 variable	 part	 that	 is	






to	 be	 symmetric,	 the	 CO2	 price	 is	 either	 50$/t	 (in	 )	 or	 30$/t	 (in	 )	 with	
probability	 0.5	 (	 ).	 The	 probability	 of	 being	 in	 either	 states	 is	
kept	 constant	 at	 0.5.	 Therefore,	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 prices	 of	 CO2	 is	





	 Conventional LCT CO2
Investment	
($/kW)	
1300	 3000 E[pCO2]	($/t) 40$/t	
	O&M	
($/kW)	
400	 1150 pCO2(θh)	($/t) 50$/t	
Fuel	($/kW)	 800	 850 pCO2(θl)	($/t) 30$/t	





The	secondt	 term	represents	 the	part	of	 the	cost	 that	 is	subject	 to	 learning‐by‐
doing	 effects.	 The	 parameter	 l 	 is	 the	 elasticity	 of	 this	 term	 with	 respect	 to	
cumulative	 investment.	 The	 learning	 rate	 is	 l 21 ,	 that	 is,	 the	 relative	 cost	
reduction	 for	 each	 doubling	 of	 capacity.	 According	 to	 MacDonald	 and	
Schrattenholzer	 (2001)	 the	average	 learning	rate	 is	15%	 for	 the	energy	sector.	







represented	 by	 a	 linear	 price	 function	 DbaDp ttt )( ,	 the	 corresponding	
yearly	consumer	surplus	 is	 DDba tt )5.0(  .	These	surplus	are	discounted	to	get	
	 and	 	by	 	 and	 	 respectively.	The	 inverse	price	
function	is	calibrated	so	as	to	have	a	market	of	300GW	initially	for	an	electricity	
price	of	50$/MWh	and	an	elasticity	of	 ‐0.7	(see	the	survey	of	Espey	and	Espey,	
2004).	 In	 the	 second	period	 the	market	 is	 twice	 larger	 than	 in	 the	 first	period.	
This	growth	of	the	market	can	be	originated	either	from	an	increase	of	demand	
or	 a	 reduction	 of	 avalaible	 capacity.	 A	 doubling	 of	 the	demand	 in	 fifteen	 years	














scenarios	 and	more	 in	 the	 uninformed	 than	 in	 the	 informed	 one.	 The	 optimal	

















no	 plants	 developed	 without	 information;	 for	 large	 learning	 rates	 (region	 C)	
there	 are	 plants	 developed	 with	 and	 without	 information	 and	 both	 quantities	
eventually	coincide	(region	D).	Thus,	for	large	learning	rates	(regions	C	and	D)	it	
is	worth	developing	LCT	in	any	cases	and	the	possibility	of	learning	that	the	LCT	
is	 not	 necessary	 calls	 for	 a	 prudential	 development	 of	 the	 technology	 in	 the	
informed	 scenario.	 It	 is	 for	 intermediary	 learning	 rates	 (region	 B)	 that	 future	
information	 can	 justify	 an	 early	 development	 of	 LCT.	 In	 that	 case,	 the	 cost	
reduction	is	sufficient	to	trigger	further	deployment	of	the	LCT	only	in	the	case	of	
a	 stringent	 CO 2 	 policy	 ( h = );	 it	 is	 not	 sufficient	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	 lax	 policy	



























patern	as	previously	 is	observed.	 In	both	cases,	as	 the	CO2	price	 increases	 four	
















The	aim	of	 the	present	work	was	 to	 solve	 an	apparent	 contradiction	 in	 the	
literature	 and	 in	 intuitive	 thinking	 on	 investments	 in	 LCTs	 in	 situations	 of	
uncertainty	 on	 the	 future	 carbon	 price:	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 these	 policies	 open	
options,	and	on	the	other	hand,	uncertainty	usually	calls	 for	careful	 investment	
policies.	 A	 simple	 analytical	model	was	 used	 to	 resolve	 this	 contradiction.	 The	





do	 so	 when	 anticipating	 the	 future	 revelation	 of	 information;	 but,	 if	 he	 does	
implement	an	LCT	policy	when	ignoring	information	discovery	he	should	have	to	
reduce	 it	 when	 anticipating	 information	 arrival.	 The	 key	 to	 this	 result	 is	 the	




This	 multiplicity	 is	 related	 to	 learning‐by‐doing,	 and	 more	 generally	 to	
endogeneous	technical	change.	The	initial	investment	in	a	technology	constitutes	
a	 pure	 loss	 until	 the	 technology	 becomes	 competitive.	 It	 is	 only	 once	 this	
competitivity	 threshold	 is	 reached	 that	 a	 marginal	 investment	 could	 increase	
welfare.		A	numerical	illustration	was	done	to	extend	the	analyzis	to	a	framework	














greenhouse	 gas	 emissions.	 The	 terms	 of	 this	 bet	 should	 be	 acknowledged.	 A	
support	 to	 LCT	 opens	 an	 option	 to	 face	 high	 carbon	 price	 and	 the	 size	 of	 this	
support	 should	 integrate	 the	 possibility	 that	 the	 carbon	 price	 be	 lower	 than	
expected.		
	
The	 second	 lesson	 is	 with	 respect	 to	 LCT	 policies	 that	 are	 decided	 by	
ignoring	uncertainty	and	considering	an	expected	carbon	price.	It	is	important	to	
stress	 that	 the	 anticipation	 of	 information	 arrival	 does	 not	 constitute	 an	
argument	 to	 stop	 these	 policies	 but	 only	 to	 downsize	 them.	 The	move	 from	 a	
corner	optimum	with	no	support	 to	LCT	 to	an	 interior	optimum	with	a	strictly	
EPRG	WP	1215	
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policy,	 two	 of	 them	 are	 worth	 further	 investigations.	 First,	 the	 uncertainty	
surrounding	 the	 carbon	 price	 was	 considered	 exogeneous.	 It	 is	 important	 to	
recognize	 that	 this	 uncertainty	 could	 be	 reduced	 by	 investing	 in	 research	 and	
international	cooperation.	It	would	be	interesting	to	analyze	whether	investment	
in	 scientific	 research	 on	 climatic	 change	 is	 a	 substitue	 or	 a	 complement	 to	
investment	 in	 technological	 options.	 Second,	 the	 analyzis	 considers	 only	 one	
general	LCT	whereas	an	important	issue	is	the	choice	of	a	portfolio	of	LCTs.	To	
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	As	 c<2 	(by	assumption)	 2211=(0,0) DDC   .	 ,0)(xC 	is	minimized	either	at	 0 	
or	 )( 2Dx 	(possibly	at	both);	in	the	latter	case,	if	 0>)( 2Dx 	then	 222 <))(( Dxc  	
and	 )()(=,0)( 111   xDcxC  .	 With	 these	 preliminaries	 we	 can	 prove	 the	
equivalence	stated.	
()	 If	 0>0x ,	 then	 )(= 20 Dxx  	 and	 0>)( 2Dx ,	 so	 )(=,0)( 11   xDxC  .	
Replacing	both	members	of	the	inequality	 (0,0)<,0)( CxC  	by	their	expressions	
(from	 (A1)	 and	 above	 preliminaries)	 implies	 )(>22 xD  	 and	 dividing	 both	
sides	by	 2D 	gives	 22 ~>  .	
()	 If	 22 ~>  ,	 then	 )(> 22 xc 	 and	 0>)( 2Dx 	 (because	 c<2 );	 therefore,	
)(=,0)( 11
  xDxC  	 and	 the	 inequality	 22 ~>  	 implies	 (0,0)<,0)( CxC  	 (by	





First,	 the	 function	 )(Dx 	 is	 strictly	 increasing,	 this	 can	 be	 shown	 by	
derivating	equation	(9)	with	respect	to	D 	and	using	the	fact	that	 2c 	is	convex	(cf	
eq.	1).	
Second,	 	 Lx 	 is	either	 0 ,	 )( 2Dx  	or	 )( 2Dx .	 Lx 	 is	defined	as	the	smallest	
argmin	 of	 the	 expected	 cost	 given	 by	 (12).	 The	 expected	 cost	 is	 twice	
differentiable	by	parts;	if	it	is	differentiable	at	 Lx 	its	derivative	is	null	and	 Lx 	is	
either	 )( 2Dx  	or	 )( 2Dx .	There	are	three	points	where	the	expected	cost	is	not	
differentiable	 :	 0 ,	 )( 212 lc   	 and	 )( 212 hc   .	 Let	us	 show	 that	 if	 Lx 	 is	one	of	
these	points	then	it	is	0 :	
‐	 Lx 	cannot	be	 )( 212 lc   	because	expected	cost	are	larger	at	this	point	
than	at	0 ;	
‐	if	 )(= 212 hL cx   	then	 LxDx  )( 	(because	 ,0)]([ xCE 	is	decreasing	to	
the	 left	of	 Lx )	and	 )( 2DxxL  	 (because	 )],([ xCE 	 is	 increasing	 to	 the	right	of	





 	 If	 22 ~>  ,	 the	 LCT	 is	 developed	 without	 information	 and	
0>)(= 2
0 Dxx  .	 With	 information,	 the	 expected	 cost	  ),( xCE 	 is	 minimized	
either	at	 0 ,  2Dx  	or	  2Dx 	all	of	which	are	smaller	or	equal	 than	  2Dx 	 so	
0xxL  .	
 	 Otherwise,	 if	 22 ~<  ,	 the	 LCT	 is	 not	 developed	 without	 information:	
0=0x .	Condition	(14)	implies	that	   0>2Dx  .	Inequalities	(15)	and	(16)	ensure	
that	  2Dx  	 locally	minimizes	  ),( xCE 	 because	   ,<)(< 2222 hl Dxc    	
and	 0>)( 2Dx  	 so	   0=/)),(( 2 xDxCE    .	 And	 finally	 (16)	 implies	 that	   )(0,<)),(( 2  CEDxCE  				
	
	
	
	
	
	
